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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
the capacity to decide many labor problems as well as the
NLRB, and that the concept of "expertise" has been ex-
tended beyond its proper and useful scope. In at least one
comment, attention has been called to the fact that Con-
gress had some such feeling in passing the Taft-Hartley
Act.45 It would seem that the majority of the Supreme
Court, however, is obviously inclined to require more ex-
plicit direction from Congress before allowing reviewing
courts to substitute their judgment as to the inferences
that may be reasonably drawn from evidence in the area
of the agency's competence such as is involved in the in-
stant cases. It would seem, also, that this could carry over
into other related matters for the same agency, the NLRB,
and as to similar matters for all other agencies.
INSANITY AS A DEFENSE - McNAGHTEN RULE
REPUDIATED BY DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Durham v. United States'
By MATHIAS J. DE VITO*
Defendant was convicted of housebreaking by the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
The only defense asserted at the trial was that the accused
was of unsound mind at the time of the offense. The defen-
dant had a long history of imprisonment and hospitaliza-
tion. From the time of his discharge for psychiatric rea-
sons from the Navy in 1945 until May of 1951, two months
before the offense, the defendant-had been committed and
released from a mental hospital three times after having
been found insane at insanity inquiries. After the commis-
sion of the housebreaking offense he was admitted to a
mental hospital for the fourth time for sixteen months
45 "The language of the conference and committee reports to 'the LMRA
indicate Congress was no longer impressed with the Board's expert
knowledge and disapproved of certain of its decisions. But what it
enacted was an enlargement of the scope of review over the Board's
decisions. It did not explicitly take away the Board's power of in-
ference, and thereby eliminate one of the basic reasons for the Board's
existence." 40 Va. L. Rev. 494, 496 (1954).
* Second year student, University of Maryland School of Law.
'214 F. 2d 862 (D. C. Cir., 1954). This decision has been followed by a
great deal of discussion in periodical literature. A partial list follows: 54
Colum. L. Rev. 1153 (1954) ; 68 Harv. L. Rev. 364 (1954) ; 40 Va. L. Rev.
799 (1954) ; 28 So. Calif. L. Rev. 86 (1954) ; 40 Cornell L. Q. 135 (1954) ;
23 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 225 (1954); 43 Geo. L. J. 58 (1954); 22 Chic. L.
Rev. 317.
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when he was released to stand trial on certificate of the
superintendent of the mental hospital that he was "'men-
tally competent to stand trial and... able to consult with
counsel to properly assist in his own defense'."2 At the trial,
a psychiatrist testified that at the time of the offense, defen-
dant was suffering from a mental disease. The lower court
found defendant guilty and rejected his plea of insanity
on the ground that it had not been established that at the
time of the offense the defendant did not know the differ-
ence between right and wrong or if he did, that he was sub-
ject to an irresistible impulse by reason of a deranged
mind. The trial court also ruled that the normal presump-
tion of sanity prevailed since no evidence of insanity was
shown at the trial sufficient to shift the burden of proving
sanity to the Government.3 The defendant, on appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, urged the reversal of the conviction on the grounds
(1) that the trial court did not correctly apply existing
rules governing the burden of proof on the defense of in-
sanity and (2) that the existing tests of criminal respon-
sibility are obsolete and should be superseded.
The Court reversed on the first contention, holding that
the testimony of the psychiatrist was "some evidence" so
that the presumption of sanity was no longer absolute. The
Court then, in obiter dictum "overruled" the existing tests
in the District of Columbia for determining criminal re-
sponsibility, i.e., the "right and wrong test"4 supplemented
by the "irresistible impulse" test,5 thereby repudiating the
rule in McNaghten's Case' which is the only test of criminal
responsibility in twenty-nine states and the main test in
the remainder of jurisdictions, save New Hampshire.7 In
2 Ibid, 864. Maryland has a similar procedure to commit a defendant
insane at time of trial until he recovers sufficiently to aid in his own de-
fense. Md. Code (1951), Art. 59, Sec. 6.
OThis rule was established in the District of Columbia in Tatum v.
United States, 190 F. 2d 612, 615 (D. C. Cir., 1951), where the court quoting
GLUEK, MENTAL DISORDE.R AND THE CRIMINA. LAW (1925), 41-42, states
that all people accused of a crime are sane, but as soon as "'some evidence
of mental disorder is introduced, the prevailing rule in most jurisdictions
is that sanity, like any other fact, must be proved as part of the prosecu-
tions case beyond a reasonable doubt'."
In Thomas v. State, 112 A. 2d 913 (Md., 1955), the Court of Appeals
approved an instruction of the trial court that "the burden of proof of
insanity lies upon the defendant".
' Guiteau's case, 10 Fed. R. 161 (1882).
5Smith v. United States, 36 F. 2d 548 (D. C. Cir., 1929).
610 Clark & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
7 For a complete list of the test for criminal responsibility in all the
jurisdictions in the United States, see WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A
CIUMINAL DEFENSE (1954), 129-173.
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overruling the existing tests the Court stated that the
right-wrong test "does not take sufficient account of psychic
realities and scientific knowledge, and (b) it is based upon
one symptom and so cannot validly be applied in all cir-
cumstances.... the 'irresistible impulse' test... gives no
recognition to mental illness characterized by brooding and
reflection.. .".s In short, the existing tests were inadequate
and too limited in their coverage. The Court then ruled
that the test to be applied in the retrial of the instant case
and in future cases is that the question of insanity is a ques-
tion for the jury and that "an accused is not criminally re-
sponsible if his unlawful act was the product of a mental
disease or mental defect".9
The right-wrong test as a criterion of criminal responsi-
bility became established in English and American law
through the famous McNaghten case."0 The rule as ex-
pressly stated in the opinion is:
"... . to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it
must be clearly proved that, at the time of the com-
mitting of the act, the party accused was labouring un-
der such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind,
as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong.""'
This right-wrong test has been severely criticized
both by psychiatrists and medico-legal authorities on the
grounds that as a sole test for criminal responsibility it fails
to take cognizance of proven medical facts but proceeds on
a Supra, n. 1, 874.
9 The court explained that it used the word "defect" in the sense that it
is a condition that would not be capable of improving or deteriorating and
"disease" in the sense that it is a condition that would be capable of improv-
ing or deteriorating. Ibid, 874-5.
10 Supra, n. 6. The importance of this case can be traced to the notorious
facts that surrounded the case. Daniel McNaghten shot and killed the
private secretary of Sir Robert Peel, thinking him to be Sir Robert. The
defendant suffered from insane delusions that his enemies were plotting
against him and that Peel was one of them. Defendant pleaded insanity
and the medical evidence indicated that the delusions affected McNaghten
in such a way that he lost control over his acts and had lost the perception
between right and wrong as 'to any act connected to his delusion. The jury
found him "not guilty on the ground of insanity". Because of the prestige
of Sir Robert, the question of the test of criminal responsibility was put
to the Judges of the House of Lords. The issue was put in the form of five
questions. The answers to these questions agreed upon by fourteen of the
fifteen judges, are the basis of modern day tests of criminal responsibility.
Supra, n. 6, 210, 722. For a complete statement concerning the facts
and a profound criticism of the McNaghten case see STEPHEN, HIsTORy OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883), Vol. II, 135-186.
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outdated and erroneous beliefs regarding insanity. Glueck
summarizes these criticisms thusly:
"... this test abstracts, unscientifically, but one ele-
ment of mental life and proceeds upon the following
erroneous assumptions: (1) that lack of knowledge of
right and wrong is the sole symptom of mental disease;
(2) that, further, such knowledge is the sole instigator
and guide of conduct, or the most important element
therein, and consequently, the sole criterion of criminal
responsibility; and (3) that capacity of knowing right
from wrong can be intact and functioning perfectly
even though a defendant is otherwise mentally un-
sound."12
From the standpoint of the psychiatrist appearing in the
role of expert witness, the right-wrong test poses an im-
portant problem. When asked if the defendant knew the
difference between right and wrong, it is felt that the psy-
chiatrist is forced to answer in a language foreign to him
as a medical practitioner, since such judgments are with-
out his experience in that field. Of course, as a member of
the community, he cannot help but share the community's
"moral" or "value" judgments on what is right or wrong.
But the presence of the psychiatrist in court is for the pur-
pose of conveying technical information, a purpose which
cannot be accomplished within the framework of the right-
wrong test. Because of the dual role forced upon him in
court, the use of his experience as a psychiatrist is minim-
ized to a great degree.'3
A large minority of states have recognized the inade-
quacy of the right-wrong test as the sole criterion of crimi-
nal responsibility and have attempted to broaden the test
so as to include not only the person who, at the time of the
act, did not have the perception to distinguish between
right and wrong, but also the one who does not have the
freedom of will to resist the impulse to commit a criminal
act. These jurisdictions have supplemented the right-wrong
test with the addition of what is commonly known as the
"irresistible impulse" test. 4 Thus, under such a broadened
concept, where a person acting under the influence of a
12 GLUECK, MENTAL DiSORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1925), 226.
lAGUTTMAOIIER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW (1952), 406-407;
Committee on Psychiatry and Law of the Group for Advancement of Psy-
chiatry, Report No. 26 (1954), CriminaZ Responsibility and Psychiatric
E.rpert Testimony, 5.
"For a discussion of historical origin of the irrestible impulse test see
WEIHOFEN, op. cit., supra, n. 7, 85, et 8eq.
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mental disease committed a criminal act though he knew
the difference between right and wrong, yet he could not
resist the impulse to commit the act, he would nevertheless
be found irresponsible. Of those jurisdictions that refuse
to adopt the irresistible impulse test, the majority base
their refusal to do so on a number of grounds:
". (1) The belief that no such disorder is in fact
possible; (2) if it does exist, it is too difficult to prove
to be allowed as a defense to crime; (3) it is a defense
dangerous to society; and (4) statutes setting forth the
right and wrong test as the only criterion of responsi-
bility prevent courts from adopting any other tests."' 5
The grafting of the "irresistible impulse" test to the
"right-wrong" test is looked upon as an advance since it
does provide for judicial recognition of the volitional as
well as the cognitive element of the criminal act. But even
the combination of "irresistible impulse" with the "right-
wrong" test is criticized by most psychiatrists as an unsatis-
factory rule of criminal responsibility. The expanded test
neglects the fundamental idea that the mind is a totally
integrated mechanism and that the mental processes func-
tion in relation to one another so that a "disturbance in the
cognitive, volitional or emotional sphere, as the case may
be, can hardly occur without its affecting the personality as
a whole and conduct flowing from the personality". 6
The single jurisdiction in the United States, before the
decision in the instant case, that ignored the limitation of
the "right-wrong" and the "irresistible impulse" test was
New Hampshire. As far back as 1870 and 1871, in State v.
Pike7 and State v. Jones,8 New Hampshire set down the
rule that has been substantially adopted in the instant case,
i.e., that there is no single test of criminal responsibility
and that the question is not one of law, but one of fact for
the jury. This rule which has become known as the New
Hampshire rule, provides that if the jury finds the criminal
act to be a product of a mental disease, the defendant should
be acquitted on the ground of insanity. The New Hamp-
shire court fully recognized that criminal intent, a neces-
sary element of a criminal act, could be absent though the
actor had knowledge of right or wrong and was not im-
pelled by an irresistible impulse. Until the principal case,
Ibid, 95.
" GLUECK, CRIME AND CORREcTION (1952), 150.
1749 N. H. 399 (1870).
Is50 N. H. 369 (1871).
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the courts have uniformly ignored or rejected the New
Hampshire view, consistent as it may be with modern
medical thought on the subject and have continued to apply
the earlier tests of criminal responsibility.
Maryland stands with the majority of the jurisdictions
on the test for criminal responsibility, having adopted the
"right-wrong" test in State v. Spencer"0 in 1888. In this
case the defendant was convicted of murder. The trial
court refused to admit evidence of the defendant's mental
condition before the committing of the crime unless such
testimony was followed with proof that the defendant was
insane and therefore irresponsible at the time of the mur-
der. On appeal the lower court's ruling was affirmed, the
Court of Appeals setting out the test that should be applied
in cases where insanity was pleaded as a criminal defense.
The Court said:
".. . if, at the time of the commission of the alleged
offense, he (defendant) had capacity and reason suffi-
cient to enable him to distinguish between right and
wrong, and understand the nature and consequences
of his act, as applied to himself, he is a responsible
agent, and amenable to the criminal law of the land for
the consequences of his act."2
In addition, the Court then specifically rejected the "irre-
sistible impulse" test as a supplement to the "right-wrong"
test. The Court acknowledged that the expanded test was
accepted in some jurisdictions and was advocated by
writers in medical jurisprudence, but held that it had no
place in Maryland, stating that:
"All crime is committed from bad motives or im-
pulses, and it is the great object of the law to com-
pel people to resist and restrain their vicious criminal
impulses; the law giving no impunity to their in-
dulgence."'"
There has been little case law dealing with the test for
criminal responsibility following the Spencer case. Subse-
quent to this 1888 decision only two cases have been found,
19 69 Md. 28, 13 Atl. 809 (1888).
O Ibid, 37. It should be noted that the wording of the Maryland right-
wrong test differs in some respects from the wording of the test as set out
in MNaghten's Case. Maryland uses the words "nature and consequences"
while the phrasing in the McNaghten Case is "nature and quality". The
Maryland test, however, is seen to be substantialy the same as the
McNaghten rule, regardless of the slight difference in wording. WEIIOFEN,
MENTAL DisoREmR AS A CRMINAL DEFENSE (1951), 71.
2 Supra, n. 19, 40.
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viz., Deems v. State2 and the more recent case of Taylor v.
State," both of which directly affirm the test of the Spencer
case as Maryland's sole criterion of criminal responsibility.
Thus, in Maryland if the defendant knows the difference
between right and wrong, yet is otherwise mentally dis-
ordered he is not considered insane under the Maryland
test and is treated as a responsible agent.24
Recently local interest has been aroused in the case of
State v. Salinger25 where the defendant, a psychopath,"
was acquitted of armed robbery and assault with intent to
rob by a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City on
the ground of insanity. In reporting the case, the Baltimore
Sun declared that the verdict ignored legal precedent and
indicated that it marked a reinterpretation of the legal test
of insanity that prevailed in Maryland." It was stated that
since Salinger was the first psychopath to be found insane
by a jury in Maryland, and since psychopaths traditionally
were not considered insane under the Maryland test, this
case marked a change in the Maryland insanity law.28
Upon a closer examination into the facts surrounding
the trial, it becomes evident that no such change or rein-
terpretation resulted. Both the Court Medical Officer and
the three unpaid experts employed by the defense agreed
that Salinger was a psychopath, but they differed in their
interpretation of the definition of a psychopath. The Court
Medical Officer testified that "under the legal definition of
insanity, Salinger was a responsible person accountable to
the law, despite medical recognition of Salinger's inability
to control his emotions. 'Technically', . . . Salinger knew
the difference between right and wrong and the nature and
consequences of this act."'29 Other psychiatric testimony
127 Md. 624, 96 Ati. 878 (1916).
U 187 Md. 306, 49 AtI. 2d 787 (1946).
Maryland has indirectly alleviated the harsh results that are bound to
occur under the strict right-wrong test for insanity by the provision for
the Patuxent Institution for defective delinquents which took effect June 1,
1954. Md. Code (1951), Code Art. 31B. Under this provision, a person who
has been found guilty under the Spencer test, but who might be considered
insane under the modern medical view, can be cared for at the Patuxent
Institution. Application for a medical examination of the defendant may
be made by the state, the defendant himself, or by the court on its own
initiative.
See Daily Record, Nov. 24, 1950. For the tests to be applied on a petition
for release from the mental institution, see Salinger v. Superintendent of
Spring ,Grove State Hospital, 112 A. 2d 907 (Md., 1955).
26A psychopath is usually defined as a person who intellectually knows
the difference between right and wrong, but is unable to control the emo-
tional urges that lead to crime. W IM0FEN, op. cit., 8upra, n. 20, 122-123.
0 Baltimore Sun, Nov. 15, 1950, 38.
28Ibid.
Ibid, 25.
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was introduced, however, to the effect that "because Sal-
inger lacked the emotional control to act on his intellectual
apprehension, he did not really 'know' the difference be-
tween right and wrong.""° The trial court, Sherbow, J.,
in his advisory charge to the jury explained that the law
applicable in the case was laid down in Spencer v. State3
and gave the test that was to be applied in the case in the
express language of the Spencer case. 2 Following this the
jury, after being informed by the trial court that the defen-
dant, if acquitted, would be committed to a state mental
institution, brought in a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity, apparently accepting the view that a psychopath,
because of his lack of emotional control, does not "really
know" the difference between right and wrong.3 8
It seems obvious, therefore, that this case marked no
change whatsoever in the Maryland test for criminal re-
sponsibility, but rather it illustrates an acceptance by the
jury of one of two divergent views held by the psychiatric
expert witnesses themselves on the question of whether a
psychopath has the knowledge of the difference between
right and wrong. 4 The test that was applied by the jury
is precisely the same test that has been always applied.
They were asked to determine whether the defendant
knew the difference between right and wrong. They found
that the defendant did not, accepting a different and some-
what broader interpretation of what the knowledge of right
and wrong is. Hence, their verdict was reached within the
framework of the Spencer case and marked no change or
reinterpretation of the legal test for insanity in Maryland.
The Salinger case, then, remains an isolated nisi prius case.
It is not improbable that in the future, a psychopath, similar
to Salinger, will be found sane under the Maryland test,
if the jury, which is the judge of the law as well as fact
in this state,8 should accept the more traditional definition
of a psychopath. Until there is a legislative enactment or
a definitive Court of Appeals ruling to the contrary0 the
0 Baltimore Sun, Sept. 30, 1953, 25.
81 Supra, n. 19.
1 Daily Record, Nov. 24, 1950.
mGu rrMACHER & WEI]I-OrEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THm LAW (1952), 98-99
reviewed, 14 Md. L. Rev. 107 (1954) ; Baltimore Sun, aupra, n. 30.
" Ibid.
wMd. Const, Art. 15, Sec. 5.
1 The Court of Appeals, in Thomas v. State, 112 A. 2d 913 (Md., 1955),
despite an argument based on the Durham case, specifically refused to apply
the New Hampshire rule, 8upra, circa, ns. 17, 18, although it pointed out in
passing that there was no evidence of a mental disease or defect to satisfy
the New Hampshire rule, "which we do not here adopt".
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test that must still be applied in future cases is that of the
Spencer case, - the right-wrong test.
The decision in the Durham case, herein noted, has
added to the controversy that has existed about the problem
of criminal responsibility since the pronouncement of the
McNaghten rule over a century ago. As expected, the psy-
chiatrists greet the Durham decision as a substantial step
toward more scientific legal procedure. 7 Certainly, the de-
cision, if followed, will give the psychiatrist-witness more
latitude in explaining to the court his scientific judgment
of the defendant's mental condition, free from the neces-
sity for making the "moral" or "value" judgments that the
psychiatrist experienced under the right-wrong test. As a
result, the court and the jury will be able to make more
effectual use of his scientific experience as a psychiatrist
than was achieved under the right-wrong rule. But those
more concerned with the legal ramifications of the decision
are not so unanimous in their approval of the Durham case
rule as the new rule for criminal responsibility. 8 Inherent
difficulties are seen in that by choice of some unfortunate
language by the Court, the test is beclouded in ambiguity.
It is clear under the decision that the jury must not only
determine whether a disease or defect existed at the time
of the act, but also whether there was a causal connection
between the act and the disease or defect. The question
arises, not answered by Durham, - must the disease or
defect be the only cause, or will a disease or defect which
is one of many causes, be sufficient to acquit the defendant?
It seems certain that some case law must follow to clear
up this aspect of the question so as to make more definite
what the trial judge must instruct the jury regarding
causality. Another fundamental problem that the case
presents is: If one concedes that the jury is the proper
body to determine criminal responsibility, what will be the
practical effect of placing this burden on that body, in view
of the fact that it will be required to interpret much more
abstract and scientific data than was required under the
right-wrong test? Will this have the effect of throwing the
ultimate determination of the responsibility question into
the hands of the testifying psychiatrists? Will the jury be
more prone to accept verbatim the opinion of a testifying
psychiatrist without attempting to make further observa-
tions: since the question may prove too involved for the
37 See Insanity and the Criminal Law - A Critique of Durham v. United
States in 22 Univ. of Chic. L. Rev. (1955), 317; particularly Roche 320;
Guttmacher, 325; Zilboorg, 331; Weihofen, 356.
8 Ibid, de Grazia, 339; Wechsler, 367; Hill, 377.
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jury's immediate understanding? If this be the case, will
the responsibility of limiting the application of this broad
doctrine be, in effect, entrusted to the psychiatrists instead
of to the court? Though an answer in the affirmative to
these questions is not necessarily an indictment of the de-
cision, such considerations are important in evaluating the
case as a new criterion of criminal responsibility. 9
The case, of course, is little more than persuasive au-
thority in Maryland and other jurisdictions in the United
States. In view of an aversion of the courts toward change
in the medico-legal field, coupled with an underlying lack
of confidence in the psychiatrist by the legal profession, 0
it seems unlikely that there will be any immediate wide-
spread adoption of the Durham view. At the most, the
practical application of the Durham case in the District
of Columbia will be carefully observed before any devia-
tion from the old and more conservative tests of legal re-
sponsibility may be expected.
0 A practical aspect of the Durham rule may be an increase in the num-
ber of acquittals on the ground of insanity. This may conceivably result
in excessive overcrowding of mental institutions or a too liberal release of
anti-social individuals. Dr. Winfred Overholzer, Superintendent of St.
Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D. C., and author of TIrE PSYCHIATRIST
AND THE LAW (1953), reviewed 14 Md. L. Rev. 390 (1954), approves of the
decision, but expresses some concern over this aspect of 'the problem in an
interview quoted in U. S. News & World Report, Feb. 11, 1955, 62-64. He
warns:
"'If you widen the door at one end, you must narrow it at the other
for the protection of society'."
It is interesting to note that upon a retrial Durham was found guilty.
10 See OvERnoLsna, ibid, 111; ZrLuoono, THE PSYCHOLOGy OF THE CRIMINAL
ACT AND PUNISHMENT (1954), 34 et seq.; GUTTMACHER AND WEIHOFEN,
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW (1952), 3 et seq.
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